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NOTES
THE LAW OF PRESUMPTIONS IN TENNESSEE
Nowhere in the law of evidence does greater confusion exist than
in the concept of a presumption and its effect. Not only is the confusion widespread, but it is intensified by the intransigence of most
judges in their rejection of the views of respected writers in the field.
No attempt will be made here-to restore order to the Tennessee law
of presumptions. The purpose of this note is merely to catalogue some
of its inconsistencies.
THE NATURE OF A PRESUMPTION

A presumption is regarded, in the abstract, as a rule of law. To
synthesize the views of several authorities, presumptions are described as rules of procedure which assign to certain fact groupings
a standard significance in order to achieve procedural convenience
and desired policy ends.' At least one author thinks it best to
describe presumptions in terms of what they are not.2 Perhaps
the simplest illustration of how the courts use the term is to call

the basic fact or fact-group A, the presumed fact or fact-group B.
Then, if A is established by proper means, the court presumes the
existence of B. Thus, if it is established that a properly addressed

and stamped letter was mailed (fact A), it is presumed to have been
duly delivered to the addressee (fact B).
Before advancing to a consideration of the Tennessee law, it is desirable to define certain terms as they will be used in the following

material. An inference is a logical deduction based on proven circumstances, a conclusion drawn from common experience. Thus if fact

A is established, fact B may be inferred if it follows logically therefrom.
A mandatory presumption is a rule of procedural law which compels
the trier of fact to find the presumed fact upon a finding of the basic
fact. A mandatory presumption has this compelling effect even
though the basic fact may or may not support an inference of the-presumed fact. A permissive presumption is a rule of procedural law
1. A presumption is "a standardized practice, under which certain oftrecurring fact groupings are held to call for uniform treatment whenever they
occur, with respect to their effect as proof to support issues." McCoRMvcK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 639 (1954). A presumption is "a relationship between one fact or group of facts and another fact or group of facts."
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENc E 30 (1954).

Presumptions

are "aids

to

reasoning and argumentation, which assume the truth of certain matters for
the purpose of some given inquiry." THAYER, EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
314 (1898).
2. A presumption is not "a conclusive presumption," nor is it "an inference."
Gausewitz, Presumptionsin a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 326 (1952).
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which permits, but does not compel, a finding of the presumed fact
upon a finding of the basic fact. A permissive presumption will thus
permit a finding of the presumed fact even though the basic fact may
or may not support an inference of the presumed fact. Both mandatory and permissive presumptions assign an artificially persuasive
effect to the basic fact if by itself it would not support an inference.
It should be noted here that the Tennessee cases rarely, if ever, use
the term permissive presumption. They contain many presumptions,
however, which seem to have only a permissive effect. Professor McCormick says that a permissive presumption has the effect of establishing a prima facie case. 3 A caveat to this statement is necessary
here, however. Tennessee decisions use the term prima facie case, or
prima facie evidence, in two senses: it either permits the jury to
make a finding, or it requires this finding, if the opposing party does
4
not go forward with the evidence.
The courts of Tennessee have variously described a presumption
as a "rule of law,' 5 "a name for a conclusion reached by means of the
weight of proven circumstances, '6 "a substitute for evidence," 7 and
"a fiction of law [that] is an assumption for convenience." 8 These
generalizations would seem to be in accord with the authorities cited
above. They are little help in the analysis of the problem, however,
except to provide a springboard for the plunge into the murky waters
below.
Presumption of Law v. Presumption of Fact; Presumptionv. Inference: It is difficult to discuss any supposed difference between a
presumption of law and a presumption of fact without considering the
correlative problem of the difference between a presumption and an
inference. The text writers are in substantial accord that a presumption is a rule of law calling for certain fixed procedural consequences,
and that an inference denotes only a rule of logic whereby one fact
may be inferred from another. 9 They thus reason that the consequences
of a presumption are compulsive, because fixed by rules of law;
that the consequences of an inference may or may not be compulsive,
3. McMoRmcK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 640.
4. That it permits a finding seems to be the general rule in Tennessee. See
Dale v. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1947); Davis v. Newson
Auto Tire & Vulcanizing Co., 141 Tenn. 527, 213 S.W. 914 (1919). But see
Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S.W.2d 295 (W.S. 1951); Duggan v.
Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 472, 159 S.W.2d 834, 837 (E.S. 1941).
5. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. H. Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 480, 159 S.W.2d
839, 842 (W.S. 1940), quoting to this effect 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed.
1940).

6. Marquet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Tenn. 213, 225, 159 S.W. 733, 736 (1913).
7. Raines v. Pile, 182 Tenn. 283, 291, 185 S.W.2d 628, 631 (1945); Siler v.
Siler, 152 Tenn. 379, 386, 277 S.W. 866, 887 (1925).
8. H.G. Hill Co. v. Squires, 25 Tenn. App. 164, 167, 153 S.W.2d 425, 427,
(E.S. 1941).
9. See, e.g., THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 340; Gausewitz, supra note 2,
at 326-27.
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depending on the varying dictates of the rules of logic and experience
in a given situation. These writers say further that there is only one
class of presumptions, and to distinguish between presumptions of
law and presumptions of fact is merely to distinguish between presumptions and inferences. 10
Tennessee courts, however, continue to distinguish between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact, sometimes using the terms
"legal presumptions" and "natural presumptions" to make the same
distinction. They usually fail to distinguish between presumptions and
inferences, often using the terms interchangeably. As elsewhere in
the law of presumptions, the resulting confusion may be traced to
the careless use of words rather than to a lack of understanding of
the inherent distinction between a presumption and an inference. The
latest Tennessee case containing a thorough discussion of these two
concepts is Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. v. Sloan," which concerned the
question of whether an employee of the defendant taxicab company
was acting within the scope of his employment when defendant's
cab, driven by the employee, struck the plaintiff. The court said that,
since the cab was registered in the principal's name, a statutory presumption 2 arose that the employee was acting within the scope of
his employment. This presumption was rebutted by defendant's
evidence that the owner had loaned the cab to the employee for the
latter's personal use. Remaining in the case in favor of the plaintiff was
testimony concerning the basic facts to the effect that the cab was
owned by the defendant and registered in its name, the driver was
wearing his regular uniform, and was apparently carrying a passenger.
These facts, said the court, constituted the basis for an inference that
the cab was being used in the business of its owner, and this inference
alone was sufficient to permit the jury to find for the plaintiff. This
is logical, for this inference is a conclusion of common experience,
and the court seems to have here correctly analysed the basic distinction between a presumption and an inference. That is to say,
though the presumption is destroyed, the inference from the basic
facts remains. A thoughtful analysis of the same problem is contained in McCloud v. City of LaFollette,13 in which the court holds
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not create a presumption of
negligence, but raises only an inference thereof.
This recognized difference is blurred, however, by the language
in other cases. In Beretta v. American Cas. Co.,14 the court endorses
10. For a good dispussion of this view, see 20 Am. Juni., Evidence § 162
(1939); 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5.
11. 193 Tenn. 352, 246 S.W.2d 41 (1952). H.G. Hill Co. v. Squires, 25 Tenn.
App. 164, 153 S.W.2d 425 (E.S. 1941) makes the same distinction without discussing the matter.
12. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, -1038 (1956).
13. 38 Tenn. App. 553, 276 S.W.2d 763 (E.S. 1954).

14. 181 Tenn. 118, 178 S.W.2d 753 (1944).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

the language of several authorities to the effect that "presumptions
must conform to the commonly accepted experiences of mankind,"'15
and "natural presumptions are derived from . . . the common ex-

perience of mankind."'16 In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. H. Rouw & Co, 17 the
court speaks of "presumptions of law," but goes on to say that "a
presumption of this kind adds nothing to the probative force of the
facts that give rise to it ...

."18 The latter is of course true if a

presumption is considered only a procedural device. What the court
seems to be saying is that in a "presumption of law" the basic fact
need not support an inference of the presumed fact. In Frank v.
Wright"9 the court adopts the proposition that:
'Presumptions of fact" are but deductions drawn from particular facts
or circumstances proved; the connection between them and the sought-'
for fact having received such sanction in the common experience of
mankind as to have become recognized as justifying the deduction to be
made by the triers of facts.

The presumption involved therein was the same statutory presumption
considered in the Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. case.20 Similar language
was used to define a presumption of fact in Cox v. Nance,21 the
court in the latter case holding that the receiver of an insolvent national bank would not be presumed to have been guilty of misconduct
in, the discharge of the duties of his office.
From these cases it can be seen that Tennessee judges realize the
existence of an inherent difference between a presumption and an
inference. The difference is that one is a rule of law; the other is a
rule of experience. This distinction is complicated, however, by the
fact that many of these presumptions actually, but not necessarily,
conform to rules of experience and logic. That is to say, the basic fact
of a presumption may or may not support an inference of the presumed fact. The phrase "support an inference" means that, given the
basic fact, the existence of the presumed fact is more probable than
not; it does not mean only that there is some rational connection between the basic and presumed facts. Thus, a jury would be justified
in finding the existence of the presumed fact even in the absence of
the presumption, if the presumption's basic fact "supports an inference" of the presumed fact. While this distinction between a presumption and an inference may seem merely a question of semantics
to those who, with Holmes, believe that the life of the law is ex15. Id. at 123, 178 S.W.2d at 755.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 124, 178 S.W.2d at 755.
25 Tenn. App. 475, 159 S.W.2d 839 (W.S. 1940).
Id. at 480, 159 S.W.2d at 842.
140 Tenn. 535, 547, 205 S.W. 434, 437 (1918).

20. See note 11 supra.
21. 24 Tenn. App. 304, 143 S.W.2d 897 (E.S. 1940).
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perience, the difference is nevertheless important, not for its nature,
but for its effect. Were the courts uniformly to perceive that this
distinction requires them to-be consistent in attaching different procedural consequences to each, the problem would be greatly simplified.
"Conclusive" Presumptions:There have been many injudicious statements in Tennessee decisions that certain presumptions are conclusive.
This language is generally used to express what is actually a rule of
substantive law; e.g., a woman who shot through the door and killed
her husband behind it will be conclusively presumed to have intended
the natural consequences of her act, 2 parties to a contract are conclusively presumed to understand the consequences thereof,2 and a
woman is conclusively presumed capable of bearing children until
death.24 In other instances the courts have said that certain facts
25
are conclusively presumed when there is no evidence to the contrary.
The latter cases merely state what are generally termed mandatory
presumptions,2 6 in that they require a directed finding if not rebutted.
That the term "conclusive" is misleading when used to describe a presumption is borne out by the relatively few allusions to the term in
Tennessee cases.
Presumptions as Evidence: It must be said, to be technically correct, that a presumption can never be evidence, for a rule of law
is a concept quite distinct from an evidentiary fact, as for example,
human nature is a concept distinct from the term humanity. Although this view is widely accepted,2 7 the cases in Tennessee indicate
that in practice some presumptions are treated as having evidentiary
value.
22. Jamison v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 Tenn. App. 398, 145 S.W.2d 553

(M.S. 1940).

23. McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197

(M.S. 1939). See also De Ford v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 182 Tenn. 255,

185 S.W.2d 617 (1945)

(insured is conclusively presumed to have knowledge

of clause in policy limiting agent's authority).
24. Stewart v. Chattanooga Say. Bank, 12 Tenn. App. 68 (E.S. 1927). See also
12 TENN.L. REV. 302 (1934).
25. Rankin v. McDearmon, 38 Tenn. App. 160, 270 S.W.2d 660 (W.S. 1953)
(presumption of revocation of one spouse's will after divorce and property
settlement); Fann v. Fann, 186 Tenn. 127, 208 S.W.2d 542 (1948) (presumption
that attesting witness signed in presence of testator).
26. See McCoRMCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 638. The question of whether
presumptions are permissive (take the case to the jury) or mandatory (require
a directed finding) falls under the heading of the procedural effect of presumptions and is discussed infra.
27. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 337-39; McBaine, Presumptions,Are They
Evidence?, 26 CALiF. L. REV. 519 (1938); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 908 (1931). For an opinion to the
contrary, see Palmer, Battle of the Presumptions, 15 Los ANGELES DAILY J.
No. 197 (1942), in which the author says that judicial evidence is anything
which the law permits the trier of fact to consider in deciding an issue of fact.
This view is critically discussed by Morgan, FurtherObservations on Presumptions, 16 So. CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1943).
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Southern Motors, Inc. v. Morton 28 involved the oft-discussed statutory presumption 9 that registration of an automobile is prima facie
evidence of ownership, and that operation thereof was for the benefit
of the owner. The court there said, "[A] presumption of the kind
we have in hand operates primarily on the power of the judge and is
not properly a factor to be considered by the jury in any event ......
(Emphasis added.) Two results follow from this reasoning. First,
this type of presumption is dissipated by credible evidence to the contrary; second, if not dissipated by the opponent's evidence, it operates
only on the power of the judge to require or permit a finding of fact,
but is never to be considered by the jury as evidence. There are
many Tennessee cases in substantial accord with this view, at least
in circumstances where the opponent presents contrary evidence. 30
It will be seen from a study of these cases that the presumption which
is not to be considered by the jury is one based primarily on procedural
convenience rather than probability or the furtherance of a desired
policy.
The Tennessee cases holding that presumptions are evidence and
therefore to be considered by the jury are limited to a few fairly
well-defined factual situations. Foremost among the more recent
cases is Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,31 which held that the presumption against suicide, in an action by the beneficiary to recover the
proceeds of a life insurance policy, remained in the case and should
be considered by the jury until overcome by a preponderance of
evidence to the contrary. In Hammond v. Union PlantersNat'l Bank,32
which involved the contest of a will on the basis of insanity, the court
held that the question of testator's alleged insanity "is to be submitted
to the jury on the preponderance of the evidence with consideration
of the presumption in favor of sanity. '33 Thus this presumption is
treated as having the force of evidence in that the jury is allowed
to consider it. Likewise, the statutory presumptionM that a person
whose blood is fifteen hundredths alcohol "shall be presumed" to be
28. 25 Tenn. App. 204, 214, 154 S.W.2d 801, 807 (W.S. 1941).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, -1038 (1956).
30. McMahan v. Tucker, 31 Tenn. App. 429, 216 S.W.2d 356 (W.S. 1948);
Raines v. Pile, 182 Tenn. 283, 185 S.W.2d 628 (1945); Central of Ga. Ry. v.
Fuller Combining Gin Co., 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 343 (1911). For other cases in
point, see note 49 infra. It is only rarely that the court must determine the
effect of a presumption when no evidence to the contrary is introduced, for
the opponent almost necessarily must present some favorable testimony if he
is seriously to present his side of the dispute.
31. 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939). This case analysed briefly and
followed Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d
251 (1935), admitting that both decisions were contra to New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Ganer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938). See also Annots., 114 A.L.R. 1226 (1938);
103 A.L.R. 185 (1936).
32. 189 Tenn. 93, 222 S.W.2d 377 (1949).
33. Id. at 99, 222 S.W.2d 380.
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1033 (1956).
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intoxicated may be considered by the jury and court along with other
35
evidence on the subject.
These are the only noted cases explicitly holding that certain presumptions are evidence. Why have the courts of Tennessee singled
out these presumptions and ascribed to them the force of evidence?
A partial answer lies in the reasons underlying their creation. 36 The
presumptions in favor of sanity and against suicide are founded in
strong probability; i.e., most people are sane, and most love life.
The statutory presumption of intoxication is based on strong scientific
probability, and a legislative policy designed to punish the intoxicated
driver and to compensate those whom he injures. While these factors
may afford an explanation of why some presumptions are considered
evidence, it does not follow that such a view is consistent with the
general law of presumptions in Tennessee. There are other presumptions founded on equally strong policy considerations; e.g., the
37
presumptions of the legitimacy of a child born to a married person,
and the validity of a second marriage. 38 There are also many so-called
presumptions as strongly founded on probability. 39 These presumptions
are not treated as having evidentiary value. It may be suggested that
when courts desire to increase the force of a presumption, they usually
require evidence of greater persuasive effect to dissipate it rather
than giving evidentiary value to the presumption itself. This method
is certainly the lesser of two evils.
Only one further thought need be expressed. It seems clear from
the decisions that the evidentiary value of the basic fact of an inference, as distinguished from that of a presumption, is never destroyed
by contrary evidence, however persuasive. 40 This is what Tennessee
courts mean when they say that "the inference [itself] is not destroyed
by contradictive testimony." 41 Were the matter to be left here, the law
would be much less confusing than it is. Many decisions go farther,
however, and completely fail to distinguish between presumptions and
inferences, indicating that a given proposition may be either, as if it
made no difference.42 This indiscriminate use of the two terms makes
it impossible to apply the rule that a jury may properly draw an inference, but may only rarely consider a presumption, for one can
never be certain which of the two concepts will be used to describe
a given fact situation.
35. Fortune v. State, 197 Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381 (1955).
36. For a thorough analysis of the usual reasons underlying the creation
of presumptions, see MCCORMICK, Op. cit. supra note 1, § 309.
37. Whipple v. McKew, 166 Tenn. 31, 60 S.W.2d 1006 (1933).
38. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 293 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953); Gamble v.
Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499 (1911).
39. See note 49 infra and related text.
40. Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. v. Sloan, 193 Tenn. 352, 246 S.W.2d 41 (1952);
H.G. Hill Co. v. Squires, 25 Tenn. App. 164, 153 S.W.2d 425 (E.S. 1941).
41. H.G. Hill Co. v. Squires, supra note 40.
42. See, e.g., Moore v. Watkins, 293 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL,. 10

THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF A PRESUMPTION

It is the purpose of this section to discuss the procedural effect of
presumptions in the law of Tennessee, approaching the problem
from two sides. The first part of the discussion will consider whether
presumptions are permissive or mandatory; the second will undertake to present the varying degrees of evidence required to dissipate
or cancel certain presumptions.
Permissive and Mandatory Presumptions: A mandatory presumption is one which, in the absence of contrary evidence, requires a
directed finding for its proponent. The widely accepted dogma that
all presumptions are mandatory had Thayer as its principal protagonist, 43 and his views were subsequently adopted by Wigmore 44 and
the American Law Institute.45 The procedural effect of a mandatory
presumption is thus to fix the burden of going forward with the
evidence on the opposing litigant. However, many courts refuse to
classify all presumptions as mandatory, and treat some presumptions
as permissive only.46 A permissive presumption has the effect of
allowing a jury to find for the proponent in the absence of contrary
evidence, but does not require it. The effect of the latter is thus to
create a prima facie case, in the sense that it allows the proponent
to get his side of the issue to the jury.47
Both views as to the procedural effect of presumptions find acceptance in the Tennessee decisions. There are few if any statements in
these opinions which use the precise language that a given presumption
requires a directed finding of the presumed fact, but many statements
to the effect that certain presumptions, if not rebutted, have a compulsive effect. 48 These presumptions are thus treated as having a manda43. "A rule of presumption does not merely say that such and such a thing
is a permissible and usual inference from other facts, but it goes on to say
that this significance shall always, in the absence of other circumstances, be
imputed to them .... " THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 317.
44. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2491 (2).
45. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704 (1942).
46. See MCCORMCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 640.
47.. See cases cited note 4 supra for Tennessee opinions defining a prima
facie case.
48. Pruitt v. Cantrell, 196 Tenn. 142, 264 S.W.2d 793 (1954) (presumption
that value placed on automobile in replevin action was within jurisdictional
amount of J.P. court); Edgemon v. State, 195 Tenn. 496, 260 S.W.2d 262 (1953),
citing Sells v. State, 156 Tenn. 610, 4 S.W.2d 349 (1928) (presumption of the
regularity of prior judicial proceedings); Morrow v. Person, 195 Tenn. 370, 259
S.W.2d 665 (1953) (presumption that subscribing witness signed in presence
of testator); Wilson v. State, 190 Tenn. 592, 230 S.W.2d 1014 (1950) (presumption that defendant was represented by counsel at trial); Fann v. Fann, 186
Tenn. 127, 208 S.W.2d 542 (1947) (presumption that testator signed in presence
of attesting witnesses); Nichols v. State, 181 Tenn. 425, 181 S.W.2d 368 (1944)
(presumption that public official has done his duty) [Cf. Lay v. Clymer, 27
Tenn. App. 518, 182 S.W.2d 425 (E.S. 1944)]; Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174
Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939) (presumption against suicide); Provident Life
& Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935) (same); Garner
v. State, 37 Tenn. App. 510, 266 S.W.2d 358 (M.S. 1953) (presumption of
knowledge of the law) [But see Bayless v. Knox County, 286 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn.
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tory effect rather than a permissive one. Most of these statements
must be considered dicta, however, for the occasion rarely arises in
which some rebuttal evidence is not presented. A study of the subject
matter of these presumptions reveals no particular pattern or common
denominator. It would seem, however, that a majority of these mandatory presumptions are rules established by the courts primarily to
further a desired policy; e.g., the presumptions relating to the regularity of judicial proceedings, the jurisdiction of courts, and the diligence
of public officials. It is fairly easy to see that these matters are not
properly questions for the trier of fact, in the absence of rebuttal
evidence, for their subject matter is not usually within a jury's common experience.
No Tennessee case has been found which holds a presumption specifically permissive. This is because the opponent of the presumption is
normally able to present some degree of persuasive evidence to the
contrary, so the courts are not faced with the problem of the effect of
such a presumption in the absence of any evidence. Several cases,
however, use terminology which seems to indicate that these presumptions have the effect only of permitting the trier of fact to find for
49
the proponent.
In addition, there are some cases -which seem to say that certain
mandatory presumptions are made permissive by the introduction
of persuasive evidence to the contrary. For example, in Hadley v.
1955)]; Bates v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 27 :Tenn. App. 17, 177

S.W.2d 360 (M.S. 1943) (presumption that law of foreign state is same as law
of Tennessee, if neither counsel raises the question); Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn.
App. 467, 159 S.W.2d 834 (E.S. 1941) (presumption of the validity of marriage); Snyder Bros. v. Morgan, 24 Tenn. App. 131, 141 S.W.2d 508 (E.S. 1940)
(semble) (presumption of compliance with the. law). [See also Todd v. RoaneAnderson Co., 35 Tenn. App. 687, 251 S.W.2d 132 (E.S. 1952)]; Stewart v.
Chattanooga Say. Bank, 12 Tenn. App. 68 (E.S. 1927) (presumption that human
beings are always capable of producing children); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Fuller
Combining Gin Co., 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 343 (1911) (presumption of negligence
of the last connecting carrier) [See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. H. Rouw &
Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 159 S.W.2d 839 (W.S. 1940) ].
49. Some of the more commonly found presumptions which seem to be
permissive appear in the following cases: De Ford v. National Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 182 Tenn. 255, 185 S.W.2d 617 (1945) (presumption that one knows
the content of a written agreement to which he is a party and intends to be
bound thereby); Berretta v. American Cas. Co., 181 Tenn. 118, 178 S.W.2d
753 (1944) (presumption that a fact or condition once in operation continues
in operation); Storie v. Norman, 174 Tenn. 647, 130 S.W.2d 101 (1939) (presumption of the validity of a written instrument); Moore v. Watkins, 293
S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956) (presumption that the deceased owner of
a wrecked automobile, found in the wreckage, was driving when the accident
occurred); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (E.S. 1952)
(presumption that the failure of a party to testify in his own behalf as to
facts peculiarly within his knowledge shows that such facts do not exist); Waller v. Skeleton, 31 Tenn. App. 103, 212 S.W.2d 690 (M.S. 1948) (presumption
that if a party has power to produce a witness who was in a position to know
the facts, and the witness is not called, his testimony would not support party's
contentions); Richmond & Co. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 16 Tenn. App. 414, 64
S.W.2d 863 (W.S. 1933) (presumption of the delivery of matter properly
mailed).
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Morris5 ° the court dealt with the presumption that a child between
the ages of seven and fourteen was not capable of contributory negligence. The court there said this was a "prima facie presumption",
but if "material evidence of capacity" was presented by the opponent,
the question became one for the jury. The court in Tidwell v. Ward5 l
spoke in similar terms of the statutory presumption making registration of an automobile prima facie evidence of ownership and of the
fact that the automobile was being operated for the benefit of the
owner. 52 The plaintiff therein evidently relied solely on the presumption to get to the jury on the question of agency; the defense produced
uncontradicted testimony to the contrary. In affirming a directed
verdict for the defendant the court said:
When the basic fact (here, registration of vehicle in defendant's name) is
stipulated or otherwise established, the presumed fact (operation in defendant's service) must be taken as true and a verdict directed for
plaintiff unless defendant meets the burden of producing evidence to
justify a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.
So far the court had indicated that this presumption is mandatory in
nature, even though it was designated a "bare, rebuttable" presumption
in the Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. case.53 However, the court went on
to say:
If the defendant does adduce such evidence it may dispel the presumption-negative the presumed fact-so as to require a directed verdict for
him, or it may merely make an issue for the jury as to the nonexistence
of the presumed fact, depending upon whether or not the evidence adduced
by defendant is not in conflict with any evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, for the plaintiff, and comes from a witness or witnesses whose
credibility is not in issue.
These cases are susceptible of two interpretations. They may be said
to adopt a rule similar to that which Morgan suggests is followed in
Pennsylvania, 54 that an opponent's contrary evidence destroys the
compulsive effect of the presumption, but not the presumption's
permissive effect. Or, they may be deemed strictly mandatory presumptions, dispelled by contrary evidence. By the latter interpretation, when the court says that the opponent's evidence creates a jury
question, it may be implicit in the opinion that a jury question results
50. 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S.W.2d 295 (W.S. 1951).
51. Docket No. 9476, Tenn. App. M.S., Nov. 11, 1956, unpublished at the time
of this writing.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, -1038 (1956).
53. See note 11 supra.
54. MORGAN, PRESUMPTIONS: TEm NATURE, PunRPos AND REASON 15-19
(Brandeis Lawyers Soc'y 1949), discussing Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47 A.2d
195 (1946); McDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944).
Cf. L. Hand, J., in Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (1930).
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only when the proponent has presented evidence other than the basic
fact of the presumption sufficient to carry his side to the jury. The
first interpretation, however, seems more likely, for the language of
these decisions indicates that the proponent may get to the jury on
the basic fact alone. Since the basic fact of neither of these presumptions will support an inference of the presumed fact, the courts must
be assigning an artificially persuasive effect to the basic fact in allowing the jury to find the presumed fact. Thus the presumption has not
been dispelled, but rather made permissive.
The vagueness of the judicial language in Tennessee makes it difficult in many cases to determine whether the court is using the term
presumption in its mandatory or permissive sense. The reasons underlying both types seem in many instances to be the same. It may be
suggested that if a presumption is not surrounded by an aura of
arbitrariness, as are many mandatory presumptions, the courts seem
to feel that it does not require a definite, fixed result. Whatever the
reasons for the apparent distinction, its results are unfortunate. It
not only creates procedural uncertainty, but contributes to the confusion inherent in the same courts' failure to distinguish between a
presumption and an inference.
Evidence Required to Dissipate a Presumption: It may easily be
predicted at this point that the persuasive effect of evidence required
to dissipate a presumption in Tennessee will vary according to the
nature of the presumption. The facility of making this prediction,
however, belies the difficulty of its application.
The rule as stated by Thayer is that evidence to the contrary-that
is, evidence which will support a jury finding of the non-exsitence of
the presumed fact-will cancel or dissipate a presumption. 5 It is
purportedly adopted in the Tennessee courts, at least with regard
to presumptions which the courts feel are "rules of law".M6 The
method is nowhere made clear, however, by which the lawyer or
judge may determine whether or not a given presumption is of this
category. One must evidently plow through the plethora of cases
involving presumptions in order to discover the quantum of evidence
necessary to rebut the presumption with which he is concerned.
Nevertheless, there are many Tennessee decisions stating that contrary
57
evidence, or its equivalent, will dissipate a presumption.
55.

THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 336.
56. "The presumption fixed by [TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, -1038 (1956)]
is 'A rule of law, fixed and relatively definite in its scope and effect, which

attaches to certain evidentiary facts and is productive of specific procedural
consequences respecting the duty of proceeding with the evidence. According

to this view, where the opponent offers evidence contrary to a presumption,
the presumption disappears, and the case stands upon the facts and whatever
inferences may be drawn therefrom.' 20 Am. Jur., Sec. 162, page 165. This is
the rule we follow." Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. v. Sloan, 193 Tenn. 352, 356,

246 S.W.2d 41, 43 (1952).

57. Contrary evidence: Norbert Trading Co. v. Underwood, 194 Tenn. 489,
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Other Tennessee cases indicate that certain presumptions do not
disappear from the case until rebutted by "satisfactory" or "material"
evidence. 58 Still others require "cogent and convincing" evidence to
the contrary,5 9 and at least one presumption does not disappear until
rebutted by a "preponderance" of evidence to the contrary.60
The practice of requiring different amounts of evidence to rebut
various presumptions raises several important questions. Is the
credibility of witnesses offering rebuttal testimony a question for
the judge or jury?61 Does the court or the jury make the decision as
to whether the presumption has been dissipated? If the presumption
has not been rebutted, may the trier of fact consider the presumption
as evidence? The answers to these questions would seem to lie partially in the views of the Tennessee courts with regard to presumptions
as evidence, and the judge's charge to the jury with respect to presumptions. The cases themselves afford little in the way of a definitive
answer.
Conflicting Presumptions: The question of the procedural effect
253 S.W.2d 723 (1952) (presumption that trading company's president may
discount and transfer negotiable instruments); Shelton v. State, 190 Tenn.

518, 230 S.W.2d 986 (1950) (presumption that head of household owns whiskey
found
on premises);
Brown v.
Hows, 163 Tenn. 138, 40 S.W.2d 1017 (1931)
(presumption
that election
certificate
signifies a valid election); Todd v.
Roane-Anderson Co., 35 Tenn. App. 68, 251 S.W.2d 132 (E.S. 1952) (presumption of compliance with the law); McMahan v. Tucker, 31 Tenn. App. 429, 216
S.W.2d 356 (W.S. 1948) (presumption that driver of owner's automobile is
driving for owner's benefit); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Fuller Combining Gin Co.,
2 Tenn. Civ. App. 343 (1911) (presumption of negligence of last connecting
carrier). Affirmative evidence: Veal v. State, 196 Tenn. 443, 268 S.W.2d 345
(1954) (presumption that head of household owns whiskey found on premises);
Morrison v. State, 195 Tenn. 646, 263 S.W.2d 504 (1953) (same). Countervailing
evidence: Illinois Cent. R.R. v. H. Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 159 S.W.2d
839 (W.S. 1940) (presumption of negligence of last connecting carrier). Positive testimony: Fann v. Fann, 186 Tenn. 127, 208 S.W.2d 542 (1948) (presumption that testator signed in presence of attesting witnesses). Credible evidence:
Evans v. State, 188 Tenn. 58, 216 S.W.2d 724 (1949) (presumption that owner
of home where whiskey is found is owner of the whiskey); Crocker v. State,
148 Tenn. 106, 251 S.W. 914 (1923) (same).
58. Satisfactory evidence: Cox v. City of Bristol, 183 Tenn. 82, 191 S.W.2d
160 (1945) (presumption of validity and regularity of tax assessment). Material evidence: Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S.W.2d 295 (W.S. 1951)
(presumption that a child 7-14 years old is not capable of negligence).
59. Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499 (1911); Hall v. Hall, 13
Tenn. App. 683 (W.S. 1931) (presumption of validity of marriage).
60. Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939) (presumption against suicide).
61. If the presumption involved is of the type which is not considered to
have evidentiary value, it necessarily follows that the question of credibility
is initially for the judge. It has thus been held that, even though the defendant
goes forward with evidence to rebut a presumption, if there is "substantial
evidence" upon which the jury could discredit defendant's witness "by his own
statements or other contradictory proof," and there is no other credible evidence on the matter, the presumption remains in the case. McMahan v.
Tucker, 31 Tenn. App. 429, 443, 216 S.W.2d 356, 362 (W.S. 1948). See also
McParland v. Pruitt, 284 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955); McConnell v.
Jones, 33 Tenn. App. 14, 228 S.W.2d 117 (M.S. 1949); Welch v. Young, 11 Tenn.
App. 431 (M.S. 1930). These cases seem to agree with the language in Tidwell
v. Ward, note 51 supra, that a mandatory presumption may become permissive
instead of being entirely destroyed by the introduction of contrary evidence.
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of conflicting presumptions has rarely arisen in Tennessee. As would
be expected, the Tennessee courts do not follow the Thayerian doctrine62 that conflicting presumptions cancel each other. This doctrine
is consistent with Thayer's emphasis on procedural convenience, which
is normally given only secondary importance in Tennessee decisions.
The rule adopted in Tennessee, as in other states which attach varying
procedural effects to various presumptions, is that the stronger of
conflicting presumptions overcomes the weaker. An example of this
rule is found in dictum in Nichols v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,63 where the
court said that the presumption against suicide, in a civil case, was
stronger than the presumption against murder, and thus prevailed.
If the two presumptions are of equal weight they cancel each other
and there is no presumption either way.64 It is difficult to determine,
however, just how the court is to decide what weight is to be assigned
a given presumption. In Dunlap v. State,65 a prosecution for bigamy,
two presumptions were present. The court held that the presumption
of the continuance of life in the defendant's first wife, last seen alive
and in extremely poor health four and a half years before trial, was
to be given equal weight with the presumption in favor of the defendant's innocence. The court there gave no reasons for this holding. It
may be supposed that the criteria to be used to determine a presumption's weight are: whether or not it is considered evidence if not
rebutted, whether it is permissive or mandatory, and the quantum of
evidence required for its rebuttal. Thus, the rule requiring a determination of the weight of conflicting presumptions carries within it
all the problems pertaining to the general status of presumptions
66
when standing alone.

THE CHARGE TO THE JURY

Probably the most confusing aspect of the law of presumptions
concerns the judge's charge to the jury with respect to the procedural
effect of various presumptions. The simplest rule, advocated by a
few authorities, 67 is that the trial judge should never mention a pre62. See

THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 343.
63. 178 Tenn. 209, 215, 156 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1941). Accord, Milstead v.
Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948).
64. Dunlap v. State, 126 Tenn. 415, 150 S.W. 86 (1912).
65. Ibid.
66. In Lay v. Clymer, 27 Tenn. App. 518, 182 S.W.2d 425 (E.S. 1943), the
defendants were public officials and did not testify. The court said that the
failure of the defendants to testify did not raise an inference that the facts
within their knowledge were adverse to their claim, because of the contrary
presumption

that they, as public officials, had regularly performed their duties.
Query: did the court, because of a failure to distinguish between inferences
and presumptions, fail to see the existence of conflicting presumptions?
67. See 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1085 (1911); L. Hand,
J., in Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir.
1932).
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sumption in his charge. This rule has several advantages in that it is
relatively easy of application, it results in procedural uniformity, and
it tends to prevent the judge from commenting to the jury on the evidence. Most of the modern authorities, however, refuse to adopt this
rule. Morgan's recommendation is that a presumption should shift
the burden of proof to its opponent, and that the jury should then be
instructed only in terms of this burden. 68 McCormick feels that the
jury should be instructed that the presumption stands, and has its
assigned procedural effect, until the jury is persuaded to the contrary. 0
Many courts purportedly adopt the rule that the presumption is never
to be mentioned. Other courts,7 0 faced with the task of reaching a just
result in the decision of a complex, living problem, seem to feel that
the rule of not mentioning any presumption simply will not accomplish the purpose for which most presumptions were initially created;
i.e., to aid the court, in the absence of adequate evidence, in effectuating
a probable and socially desirable result.
The Tennessee courts seem to endorse the latter view, although
the few cases so holding do little more than merely air the problem.
The case of McMahan v. Tucker 7 l dealt with the statutory presumption
that proof of registration of an automobile in a defendant's name is
prima facie evidence of ownership and that operation is for the owner's
benefit.7 2 The court there held that it was reversible error for the
trial judge to instruct the jury that this presumption was to be considered by them as evidence and weighed with the proven facts. The
presumption against suicide in a civil case, on the other hand, must
be mentioned to the jury.73 The cases involving the latter presumption
hold that the jury must consider it along with other evidence until
convinced otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. These two
presumptions are the only ones noted concerning which the court deals
specifically with the question of instructing the jury. They are a
"bare, rebuttable presumption" and a very weighty one, respectively,
which together may be said to represent the opposite extremes of
procedural effect.
68. Morgan, Presumptions,12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 281 (1937).
69. McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presump-

tions?, 13 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1938). See also Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1939).
70. For a collection of opinions sanctioning instruction on presumptions, see
McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 314 n.6 (1954).
71. 31 Tenn. App. 429, 216 S.W.2d 356 (W.S. 1948). This opinion is in accord
with the holding in Southern Motors, Inc. v. Morton, 25 Tenn. App. 204, 154
S.W.2d 801 (W.S. 1941) that the type of presumption therein involved related
solely to the power of the judge, and was in no event to be considered by the
jury.
72. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, -1038 (1956).
73. Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939);
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935).
For a cursory statement of the reasons why this presumption should not be
mentioned to the jury, see Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d
724, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1935); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 185 (1936).
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The unarticulated rule in Tennessee may therefore be understood
to require a mention of some presumptions and to forbid the mention
of others. The view may thus be hazarded that a presumption which
is susceptible of rebuttal by credible evidence to the contrary may
never be mentioned to the jury. Further, a presumption which is
rebutted only by some greater quantum of evidence should be mentioned by the judge in the same breath in which he defines this quantum. Such a view, however, is contrary to the historical concept that
a presumption is an aid only to the judge, not the jury. If a presumption has the force of evidence, the judge must obviously inform
the jury of its effect if it is to be weighed by them.
This aspect of the law of presumptions has been thoroughly discussed by various learned jurists, 74 with little or no seeming effect
upon the overabundance of confusion therein. It is therefore not
surprising that this same confusion is no stranger to the law of Tennessee. Fundamentally, the judge must inform the jury of the law
on the subject with which they must be concerned for the moment.
If the law insists on distinguishing between varying types of presumptions with varying procedural effects, the judges must state this law,
confusing as it may be, to the jury. Only if some semblance of uniformity is brought to the rules regarding the procedural effect of
presumptions will the judge's task be lightened.

RELATIONSHIP OF PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

The generally accepted definition of the burden of proof is that it
is the burden of persuading the trier of fact to make a finding; i.e., the
risk of non-persuasion. It is thereby distinguished from the burden of
going forward with the evidence, which is the burden of producing
sufficient evidence to justify a finding of fact; i.e., the risk of nonproduction of evidence.75 Also generally accepted is Thayer's statement that the burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings, or their
equivalent, preliminary to trial and, once fixed, never shifts.76 He
further states that the burden is always on the actor, which is the
party who has the affirmative side of the issue.7 7 The actor may be
either the plaintiff or the defendant, depending on whether the issue
is a part of the plaintiff's case or an affirmative defense, respectively.
Tennessee purportedly adopts both the definition and the rule advocated by Thayer. The modern Tennessee cases which discuss the
relationship of a presumption and the burden of proof hold that, since
this burden never shifts, presumptions shift only the burden of going
74. See notes 67-69 supra.
75. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 1
76. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 378.
77. Id. at 355.

(1942).
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forward with the evidence.78 This is of course in accord with the
many cases cited above 9 which hold that a presumption is dissipated
by varying amounts of evidence short of a preponderance thereof.
Were the Tennessee lawyer or judge faced only with this material,
his ideas on the relationship of presumptions and burden of proof
would be reasonably clear-cut, and his task proportionately simpler.
Other cases on the subject, however, muddy the waters. In Provident
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto,80 the court sanctioned a charge to the
jury which said: (1) "[T]he presumption against suicide.., does not
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving . . .that the death of

J. A. Prieto was brought about solely through accidental means," 81
and (2) "[The defense that the insured did commit suicide] is an
affirmative defense set up by the defendant, and the burden is upon
the defendant to establish same by the preponderance of the evidence. '82 (Emphasis added.) The court's treatment of this inconsistency is not clear, but it seems to escape the dilemma by saying that
the defendant had the burden of proof only in its secondary sense,
which, though not stated, must mean the burden of going forward
with the evidence. This rationalization simply will not hold water.
The defendant was not required merely to go forward; it was required
to persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence. The persuasiveness of evidence required to dissipate the presumption in this
case in fact shifted the burden of proof.
Other cases show that the courts use the phrase "burden of proof"
when they mean burden of going forward with the evidence. In a suit
to have a deed declared void, if the complainant's evidence shows
suspicious circumstances surrounding the deed's execution, "the burden is then cast on the vendee to prove the bona fides of the transaction. . .

."83

The court evidently felt that the vendor's evidence implied

a presumption in his favor. Similarly, in an action for divorce, the
presumption in favor of the validity of marriage casts upon the
defendant the burden of proving it invalid.8 This same confusion
of the two burdens is especially prevalent in wills cases, and these
85
decisions are thoroughly discussed elsewhere.
78. Whipple v. McKew, 166 Tenn. 31, 60 S.W.2d 1006 (1933); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. H. Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 159 S.W.2d 839 (W.S. 1940). See also
13 McHI's TENN. DIGEST §§ 43-50 (1938). Some older cases held that a presumption shifted the burden of proof. See, e.g., Caruthers & Wright v. Harbert,
45 Tenn. 362 (1868); Robertson v. Branch, 35 Tenn. 302 (1856).
79. See cases cited notes 57-59 supra.
80. 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935).
81. Id. at 139, 83 S.W.2d 257.
82. Ibid.
83. Anderson v. Nichols, 286 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955). See
also Braswell v. Tindall, 294 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1956). For an example of the
converse of this situation, involving fraud in the execution of a will, see
Haynes v. Mullins, 30 Tenn. App. 615, 209 S.W.2d 278 (E.S. 1947).
84. Hall v. Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683 (W.S. 1931).
85. Morgan, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Will Contests in Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. Rsv. 74 (1951).
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One further inconsistency exists in the relationship between a
presumption and the burden of proof. It will be remembered that
both mandatory and permissive presumptions exist in the framework
of Tennessee law, and that they have different procedural consequences. As has been noted, however, the courts of Tennessee adhere
generally to the rule that all presumptions, permissive or mandatory,
do no more than shift the burden of going forward with the evidence.
It is correct to say that a mandatory presumption shifts the burden
of going forward with the evidence, for if a mandatory presumption
is not rebutted, it will result in a directed finding of the presumed
fact for its proponent. Thus, a true burden has been shifted, for
without the presumption in favor of the proponent, he has the burden
of first producing evidence concerning the issue which is the subject
of the presumption. Without the presumption he will not get to the
jury on that issue. It is quite incorrect, however, to say that a permissive presumption shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence,
for the opponent may still get to the jury even if he offers no rebuttal
evidence. No true burden, therefore, has been shifted. In this sense,
permissive presumptions create a prima facie case in that they merely
permit the jury to find for the proponent.
CONCLUSION

Many divergent views regarding presumptions and their effect
are present in Tennessee cases. The result is that glaring inconsistencies co-exist within this body of law, and opposing litigants with
contradictory views on presumptions may each find support in Tennessee authorities. This confusion is at best a malignant growth. Though
by no means a cure, the operation most likely to relieve the suffering
caused by this growth is a strict adherence to the belief that a presumption and an inference should not be equated. This would require
diligence, for the two are not easily distinguishable. Beyond that, it
is difficult to generalize. The Thayerian doctrine commends itself for
its simplicity, but it fails to put sufficient emphasis on the reasons
behind the creation of presumptions. As the reasons vary in importance,, so should the effects of presumptions. The best medicine on a
long term basis is a realization on the part of judges and lawyers alike
that the rules concerning presumptions require precise expression.
This realization, if applied, would go far toward improving the patient's prognosis.
E. WILLIAM HENRY

